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SZMAJ V. AT& T-BAD NEWS FOR BOOK
WORMS, JUDGES, AND LITIGANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1996, George Szmaj sought and received a
promotion with his long-time employer, American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T).' For most people, a promotion is a
cause for celebration. Szmaj's promotion, however, turned out to be
anything but that.
Szmaj suffered from congenital nystagmus, a condition that
caused his eyes to twitch constantly, making it difficult to focus
2while reading. Therefore, it was extremely uncomfortable for him
to spend more than fifty percent of his day reading a computer
screen.3 Unfortunately, his new position as global services manager
required that he read a computer screen for most of the day.4 This
higher reading load, combined with the constant eye twitching and
difficulty focusing even while wearing glasses, caused "a lot of
stress... fatigue and headaches."
5
Szmaj claimed that his congenital nystagmus qualified him as a
person with a disability, bringing him under the protection of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).6 He requested, as an
accommodation for the alleged disability, that he be moved to
another position that required less reading.7 AT&T refused to grant
the accommodation.
8
1. See Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel., Inc., No. 99-1353, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22601, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2001).
2. See id. at *1, *6.
3. See id. at *7.
4. See id. at *6.
5. Id.
6. See id. at *1.
7. See Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2002);
see also Szmaj, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22601 at *6-7.
8. See Szmaj, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22601 at *6-7.
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In Szmaj v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. ,9 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals sided with AT&T and denied Szmaj relief
under the ADA.10 The court held that the "ability to read all day
long is not a major life activity,""I one of the elements necessary to
state a claim under the ADA.12  However, the court declined to
discuss whether reading itself, without the "all day long"
qualification, merited recognition as a major life activity. The
Second and Sixth Circuits had already explicitly recognized reading
as a major life activity by the time Szmaj was decided.' 3 Conversely,
the Seventh Circuit's reticence to address whether reading is
cognizable as a major life activity 14 makes it unlikely that the
Seventh Circuit will ever grant relief to plaintiffs who assert
"reading" as the major life activity that their alleged disabling
condition substantially limits under the ADA.
A. Stating a Claim: Three Elements Must Be Established to Qualify
as a Person with a Disability
Title I of the ADA provides that no employer "shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability .... " 15 Under the
Act, a "disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more... major life activities .... 6
Congress authorized the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to issue regulations to bring employers into
compliance with the ADA.' 7 Although the EEOC's regulations are
9. 291 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2002).
10. See id. at 956.
11. Id.
12. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2002).
13. See Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 226 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir.
2000); see also Gonzales v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 225 F.3d 620, 627-28
(6th Cir. 2000).
14. See generally Radimecky v. Mercy Health Care and Rehab. Ctr., No.
00-C-2889, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2001)
(stating that it explicitly "reserves judgment as to whether reading actually
constitutes a major life activity.. ." just weeks after the Szmaj district court
ruling and before the court of appeals declined to address "reading" as a major
life activity).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2001).
16. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
17. See id. § 12116 (stating, "Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act... , the Commission shall issue regulations in an
accessible format to carry out this subchapter .... ").
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not binding on the courts' interpretations of the ADA, they are highly
persuasive and given judicial deference. 18 These regulations are
found in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and other EEOC
publications. The EEOC's definition of "disability" mirrors the
statutory language of the ADA.19 To qualify as a person with a
disability, a person must adduce enough evidence to satisfy the
following three elements: 1) he or she has an impairment, 2) that
limits a major life activity, 3) substantially.
2 0
The first element, an "impairment," includes any physiological
disorder.2 1  The second element, a "major life activity," includes
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."22 The list is illustrative, rather than exhaustive.23 In fact,
the EEOC has approved judicial addition of other activities to the list
as well.2"
18. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 480 (1999).
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (2002).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(g)(1).
21. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).
22. Id. § 1630.2(i).
23. See Equal Employment Compliance Manual § 902.3(b) (1995).
This list is not an exhaustive list of all major life activities. Instead, it
is representative of the types of activities that are major life activities.
Specific activities that are similar to the listed activities in terms of
their impact on an individual's functioning, as compared to the
average person, also may be major life activities ......
Id.
24. See id. § 902.3(c) ("Judicial Interpretations-Courts... also have
found that other activities constitute major life activities. Such major life
activities include sitting and standing... and reading...."); see also Sandra
M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infertility: Fertile Grounds for
Accommodating Infertile Couples Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
46 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1051, 1069. Ms. Tomkowicz explains:
This latest guidance from the EEOC is instructive because it reflects
concretely the EEOC's presumption in favor of a broad, inclusive
reading of the statute. In the [EEOC Compliance Manual], the EEOC
once again cautioned that the list of major life activities set forth in its
regulations "is not an exhaustive list of all major life activities." With
this foundation laid, the EEOC expanded its previous examples of
major life activities to include reading, as well as "emotional
processes such as thinking, concentrating and interacting with others."
Id. (citations omitted).
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The third element, "substantial limitation," is an inability to
perform25 or a significant restriction as to the condition, manner, or
duration of performance of a major life activity as compared to the
average person.26  In determining whether an individual is
substantially limited, considerations include the impairment's nature
and severity,27 duration,28 and permanence or long-term impact.29
The ADA requires that employers grant reasonable
accommodations in the work place to employees who have a
qualifying disability.3 ° In one of its handbooks designed to provide
simple guidance for employers, the EEOC explained, "[r]easonable
accommodation is any modification or adjustment to a job or the
work environment that... enable[s] a[n] ... employee with a
disability to participate in the application process or to perform
essential job functions .... 1 A reasonable accommodation may
include moving the employee to a new job, as made clear in the
EEOC's question and answer handbook:
Examples of reasonable accommodation include making
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by an individual with a disability; restructuring a
job; modifying work schedules; acquiring or modifying
equipment; providing qualified readers or interpreters; or
appropriately modifying examinations, training, or other
programs. Reasonable accommodation also may include
reassigning a current employee to a vacant position for
which the individual is qualified, if the person is unable to
do the original job because of a disability even with an
accommodation.
32
This requirement of accommodation, however, has limits. There
is no need to reassign employees who are not qualified for the new
position.33  Additionally, the employer is required to reassign
25. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2002).
26. See id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
27. See id. § 1630.20)(2)(i).
28. See id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii).
29. See id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2002).
31. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 5 (2001).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 5-6.
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employees only when doing so is "reasonable." 34 An employer is not
required to afford an accommodation that poses an undue hardship
on the employer.35 In assessing hardship, factors such as the size and
resources of the employer are weighed against the burden of the
accommodation sought.
36
B. Plaintiff George Szmaj Claimed His Impairment, Congenital
Nystagmus, Substantially Limited a Major Life Activity, Seeing, Thus
Requiring His Employer to Grant Him a Reasonable Accommodation
Szmaj was employed by the defendant, AT&T, for many years
in different capacities. 37 During his time with AT&T before October
1996, he described his condition "generally as not being able to see
what a normal person sees." 38 His glasses corrected his visual acuity
to only 20/80 in the left eye and 20/60 in the right eye. 39 Although
he could drive, he could not read street name signs until he passed
the street.40 License plates, too, were illegible until he was "bumper
to bumper" with the passing cars.4 1 In spite of his limitations, Szmaj
could "generally accomplish what a person with normal vision could
achieve"42 by putting reading materials closer to his eyes and taking
extra time to read.43
Szmaj's vision limitations, however, posed additional problems
in his new position. His promotion to global services manager
required him to read a computer screen for eighty percent of the
workday. 44 Due to his substantially increased reading load and
constant eye twitching, Szmaj developed headaches and became
34. See id. at 5.
35. Seeid. at 6-7.
36. See id. at 7 (stating, "In general, a larger employer with greater
resources would be expected to make accommodations requiring greater effort
or expense than would be required of a smaller employer with fewer
resources.").
37. See Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 99-1353, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22601, at *6 (C.D. 11. Aug. 7, 2001).
38. Id. at *5.
39. See id. at *6.
40. See id. at *5.
41. See id.
42. Id. at *6.
43. See id.
44. See Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2002).
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more easily fatigued in his new position.45 When AT&T refused to
transfer him to another position, Szmaj filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois, claiming that AT&T
failed to provide reasonable accommodation for his disability as
required under the ADA.46 At the close of the plaintiffs evidence,
AT&T moved for judgment as a matter of law in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) (Rule 50(b)).47 The district
court took the motion under advisement and did not rule on it.48 The
defendant did not renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law at
the close of all evidence. 49 The matter was submitted to the jury,
who found in favor of Szmaj.50
C. The District Court Granted the Defendant's Renewed Rule 50(b)
Motion, Concluding that No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found
George Szmaj's Condition Qualified Him as a Person with a
Disability Under the ADA
After the jury verdict, the defendant renewed its Rule 50(b)
motion for judgment as a matter of law "reassert[ing] its position that
there [was] not a legally sufficient evidentiary basis in the record for
a reasonable jury to find that Mr. Szmaj [was] substantially limited in
the major life activity of seeing."
51
The district court granted the defendant's renewed Rule 50(b)
motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding the plaintiff had
not alleged sufficient facts for the jury to conclude that he met all
three of the elements required to find that his condition rose to the
level of a disability under the ADA.52 It was undisputed that Szmaj's
congenital nystagmus rose to the level of an impairment, the first
required element. 53 Furthermore, there was no dispute that "seeing"
qualified as a major life activity, meeting the second element.5 4 The
45. See Szmaj, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22601, at *6.
46. See id. at *1.
47. See Szmaj, 291 F.3d at 957.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Szmaj, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22601, at *1.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
1344
Spring 2003] SZMAJ V. AT&T 1345
third element, substantial limitation, however, was not met according
to the court.55
The court, quoting Roth v. Lutheran General Hospital,56
explained, "'Not every impairment that affect[s] an individual's
major life activities is a substantially limiting impairment.'...
'[T]he key is the extent to which the impairment restricts a major life
activity; the impairment must be a significant one."' 57 All parties to
the litigation conceded that the plaintiff did in fact have congenital
nystagmus and that it satisfied the "impairment" element of the
test.58 This, however, is only the beginning of the analysis.
The court concluded that the plaintiff's impairment was not
significant, especially when compared to the abilities of most other
people. 59 For instance, the plaintiff conceded that before he became
the global services manager, he could do the same work as his co-
workers who did not have visual impairments.
60
After finding that the plaintiff was able to perform the same
work that employees in at least two hundred other jobs at AT&T
could perform,61 the court noted that the EEOC's regulations explain
that whether a person is significantly restricted must be evaluated in
comparison to the capabilities of an "average person in the general
population."62  Since the plaintiff himself admitted that he could
perform the same tasks as hundreds of other workers in other jobs,
the court explained that his visual limitation did not meet the
EEOC's standard, stating:
All Plaintiff has succeeded in showing is that his eye
condition substantially limits his ability to see in the context
of a specific job .... [T]his is not a substantial limitation
of his ability to work. His difficulty seeing.., while he is
driving is also a relatively narrow impediment in the
context of his seeing all of the things that a person with
55. See id. at *1-2.
56. 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995).
57. Szmaj, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22601, at *1 (quoting Roth v. Lutheran
Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d. 1446-1451 (7th Cir. 1995)).
58. See id. at *6.
59. See id. at *7-8.
60. See id. at *6.
61. See id. at *7.
62. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2002)).
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normal vision sees and is, therefore, not a substantial
limitation on the major life activity of seeing.
63
The court next analyzed judicial precedent involving visual
impairments under the ADA.64 The court cited several other cases
holding that "a visual impairment which hinders, or makes it more
difficult for an individual to function at a full visual capacity" 65 does
not rise to the level of a substantial limitation.66 Therefore, based on
the EEOC's regulations and case law precedent, the court granted the
defendant's Rule 50(b) motion, holding that no reasonable jury could
have concluded that Szmaj was substantially limited in the major life
activity, "seeing."
Although the defendant had not renewed its motion at the close
of all evidence and before the jury announced its ruling as required
by the literal language of the rule,67 the court overturned the jury's
award and granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter
of law.68 The plaintiff appealed on two bases: 1) that the wrong
legal standard of substantial limitation was applied and, thus, a
reasonable accommodation should have been required, and 2) the
district court should not have ruled as a matter of law since the
63. Id. at *7-8.
64. See id. at "8-10.
65. Id. at *9.
66. See id. at *8-9 (citing Monell v. Kansas Ass'n of Sch. Bds., No. 98-
4063-SAC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5829 (D. Kan. Apr. 18, 2001) (holding that
a plaintiffs double vision which limited her ability to read a computer screen
for long periods of time and limited her driving ability was not a substantial
limitation)); Phillips v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1284 (S.D.
Ala. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff's sporadic blurred vision was not a
substantial limitation because he could perform various activities requiring the
use of sight including driving, working, and reading); Person v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 361 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs
condition, which caused her pain, redness, dryness, and blurred or double
vision during the evening hours, was not substantially limiting); Schluter v.
Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437 [6 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 625]
(W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs condition, which limited her
ability to drive a car in heavy traffic or for long distances and which limited
her ability to read for more than thirty to forty-five minutes at a time, was not
substantially limiting).
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
68. See Szmaj, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22601, at *1.
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defendant did not renew its initial motion at the close of all evidence
and before the jury returned a verdict.
69
II. SUMMARY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
The court in Szmaj first considered as a threshold matter whether
the plaintiffs condition, congenital nystagmus, was in fact covered
by the ADA. 70 The court explained, "[T]he Act does impose a duty
of accommodation," but "[t]he duty of accommodation arises only if
the employee is determined to have a disability within the meaning
of the Act .... ,7 1 Therefore, even though it may not have posed an
undue hardship on an employer such as AT&T to grant the plaintiff
an accommodation in the form of reassignment to a job requiring less
reading, that obligation would not arise unless a qualifying disability
is found first.
If the condition does not rise to the level of a disability, then as a
matter of law, no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff. The
Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision stating, "[W]e
agree with the district judge that no jury could reasonably find that
the plaintiff did have such a disability."
72
The Seventh Circuit employed the EEOC's three-part test to
determine whether the district court erred in finding as a matter of
law that the jury could not find the plaintiff was a person with a
disability.73  First, the court implicitly accepted the defendant's
concession that the plaintiff had an impairment, satisfying the first
element of the test.
74
Next, the court evaluated whether this impairment, congenital
nystagmus, affected a major life activity, the second part of the test.
75
Unlike the district court, the Seventh Circuit did not discuss "seeing"
as the major life activity. Instead, the court found that the "ability to
read all day long is not a major life activity." 76 The Seventh Circuit
69. See Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 F.3d 955, 956-57 (7th Cir.
2002).
70. See id. at 956.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id.; see also Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Inc., No. 99-1353, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22601, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Aug.7, 2001).
75. See Szmaj, 291 F.3d at 956.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
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concluded that reading all day long is not a major life activity
because the majority of society does not read all day long. The court
explained:
A disability is a condition that substantially prevents a
person from engaging in one of the major activities of life,
such as walking, seeing, or reproduction. We can imagine,
though with some difficulty, a society of bookworms in
which a person unable to read more than 50 percent of the
time would be deemed unable to engage in a major activity
of life. That is not our society. To be unable to read all day
long is a misfortune for someone who loves to read or who
wants to hold a job (a judgeship for example!) that requires
continuous reading, but the ability to read all day long is not
a major life activity.77
The court next appeared to turn its attention to the third element,
"substantial limitation." The court noted that even if "reading all day
long" were a major life activity, the plaintiff was admittedly capable
of reading. 78  Although the court did not explicitly use the
"substantial limitation" language of the EEOC's regulations, its
discussion implied its conclusion that discomfort alone does not rise
to the level of a substantial limitation. 79 The court stated:
There is case authority that to have enough vision to be able
to read a significant part of the day is [a major life]
activity.., but that much vision the plaintiff has. True he
cannot read at all without some discomfort, because his
difficulty in focusing is continuous; but discomfort and
disability are not synonyms.
8 0
If discomfort alone were enough, the court expressed concern that "a
very large fraction of the work force would be disabled.",
81
In dismissing "reading all day" as a major life activity, the court
recognized that there was strong precedent in two other circuits,
which held that the ability to read a majority of the day is a major life
activity. 2 In Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,83
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 957.
82. See id. at 956.
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the Second Circuit considered whether a recent law school
graduate's dyslexia brought her under the protection of the ADA.84
The court held that reading was a major life activity under the
85definition of the ADA. In determining whether the plaintiff had a
substantial limitation of the life activity, reading, the court
considered whether she was "'restricted as to the conditions, manner,
or duration under which they can be performed in comparison to
most people."' 86 The court explained, "It is not enough that Bartlett
has average skills on 'some' measures if her skills are below average
on other measures to an extent that her ability to read is substantially
limited. 8 7  She found reading difficult, not impossible. This,
however, did not preclude a finding of substantial limitation.
In Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners,88 the
Sixth Circuit applied a similar test to evaluate whether the plaintiff's
alleged learning impairment substantially limited his ability to read.89
In that case, the facts did not support the plaintiff qualifying as a
person with a disability because he could read as well as the average
person.90 As in the Second Circuit, the plaintiff needed to show that
he could not read "as well as the average person," rather than show
that he could not read at all.91
Finally, as to Szmaj's contention that the jury's award should
have been allowed to stand since the defendant did not renew the
motion at the close of all evidence as required by Rule 50(b), the
court explained that although the rule requires renewal, the
requirement has not traditionally been strictly enforced.92
Additionally, the consequence for failure to renew is not explicitly
mentioned in the rule.93 Thus, even strict enforcement of the rule
would not necessarily demand overturning the jury award due to the
83. 226 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2000).
84. See id. at 74.
85. See id. at 80.
86. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A § 35.104 (1999) (emphasis in
original)).
87. Id. at 81.
88. 225 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2000).
89. See id. at 626.
90. See id. at 629.
91. Id.
92. See Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 F.3d 955, 957 (7th Cir. 2002).
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
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defendant's failure to renew. Finally, the purpose for requiring
renewal is to put the plaintiff on notice that granting judgment as a
matter of law is still a possibility. 94 This is especially important in
cases where the motion for judgment as a matter of law has been
denied, since after the denial, the plaintiff lacks motive to adduce
additional evidence that a jury issue remains and that the motion
should be denied.95 The court explained that in this case, however,
the judge took the original motion under advisement, rather than
denying the motion. 96 Therefore, the plaintiff was on notice that the
question whether the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law was a live issue.97 The court explained:
[N]either the language of Rule 50(b) nor the committee
note suggests that renewal of the motion is required in the
circumstance; and requiring a party to file a motion before a
previous identical motion has been ruled on is wasteful.
The case law overwhelmingly denies that failure to renew
in this circumstance is inexcusable.
98
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' REASONING
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit did not analyze "seeing" as a
major life activity. Instead, the court, in a brief discussion, held that
"the ability to read all day long is not a major life activity."99 It is
unusual for a court to raise arguments and issues on its own. The
district court limited its analysis of major life activities to "seeing."
Additionally, nothing in the record shows that either litigant
proposed "reading all day long," or even merely "reading," as a
major life activity that the plaintiffs condition substantially limited.
It is a widely accepted notion that our adversarial system of justice
works most efficiently when courts consider only those issues
presented by the litigants. 00 Since the court has little fact finding
ability of its own, issues raised and then ruled on by the court
94. See Szmaj, 291 F.3d at 958.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 956.
100. See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIviL
PROCEDURE CASES AND PROBLEMS 47-53 (2d ed. 2001).
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without both of the parties active involvement are rarely fully and
vigorously litigated.l1 Therefore, the court's holding that reading all
day long is not a major life activity did little to address the plaintiff's
appeal, and, instead, raised issues not even presented by the litigants.
Furthermore, the court failed to make a bona fide effort to either
discuss whether "seeing" was substantially limited or to identify the
real major life function at issue. Instead the court set up a proverbial
"straw man"-claiming that the major life function that should be
analyzed is "reading all day"-and then, having identified an activity
that is clearly not a major life function, the court knocked it down.
10 2
The court should have just focused on "seeing" as the major life
activity.
Since the court insisted on analyzing "reading," it should at least
have performed more than a cursory analysis. A more in-depth
analysis might have acknowledged that whether reading qualifies as
a major life activity was as yet unanswered in the Seventh Circuit.
The court then could have agreed or disagreed with the Second and
Sixth Circuits, which had recognized reading as a major life activity.
The court seems to disagree with the Second and Sixth Circuits'
judicial addition of reading to the list of major life activities.
Perhaps it did not state its disagreement explicitly to avoid the risk of
being overturned if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari to
resolve the conflict between the circuits. Instead of exposing the
rationale behind its refusal to acknowledge reading as a major life
activity, it took the safer road, explaining instead, why "reading all
day long" is not a major life activity, a proposition that even the
plaintiff would not argue against.
A more structured approach would have analyzed the plaintiffs
case in three stages: 1) Whether congenital nystagmus qualifies as
an "impairment," 2) Whether reading qualifies as a "major life
activity," and 3) Whether the inability to read all day long (or, more
accurately, eighty percent of the day) meets the standard for a
"substantial limitation." This more structured approach is preferable
because it tracks the three elements-l) having an impairment, 2)
that limits a major life activity, 3) substantially-established by the
ADA and reflected in the EEOC's regulations. 10 3 Using the statute
101. See id.
102. See Szmaj, 291 F.3d at 956.
103. See supra Part I.A.
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as a guide for analysis would have provided an easy to use model for
lower courts in their future evaluation of ADA claims. This, in turn,
would reduce uncertainty for future litigants trying to predict what
level of protection will be afforded their alleged conditions under the
ADA.
However, despite the structure of its analysis, the court correctly
concluded that Szmaj was not a person with a qualifying disability.
Even if the court had acknowledged reading as the major life
activity, Szmaj's case would have failed because the third element,
the plaintiffs inability to read for eighty percent of the day, clearly
did not rise to the level of a substantial limitation. This standard was
articulated clearly by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc. 104 The Supreme Court noted that the term "substantially"
suggests "'considerable,"' "'specified to a large degree,"' and "'in a
substantial manner."' ' 10 5  The term "substantial" means
"'considerable in amount, value, or worth,' "'being that specified to
a large degree or in the main,' "' [rielating to or proceeding from the
essence of a thing; essential,"' and "'of ample or considerable
amount, quantity or dimensions.''' 06 The court in Gonzales agreed
that "the Supreme Court's review of these definitions confirms that
the ADA addresses impairments that limit an individual, not in a
trivial or even moderate manner, but in a major way, to a
considerable amount, or to a large degree."' 0 7  Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the plaintiffs discomfort is not
synonymous with disability 10 8 is squarely in line with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of a substantial limitation. Since the plaintiffs
impairment did not substantially limit any recognized major life
activity, the court correctly granted the defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
Finally, the court's decision not to require strict adherence to
Rule 50(b) seems well grounded in policy because it did not result in
any unfairness to the plaintiff. The judge had not denied the original
104. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
105. Id. at 491 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2280 (1976)).
106. Id. (quoting 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 66-67 (2d. ed. 1989)
and WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280).
107. Gonzales v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 225 F.3d 620, 627 n.12 (6th
Cir. 2000).
108. See Szmaj, 291 F.3d at 956.
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motion, but instead had taken the original motion under advisement.
Consequently, the plaintiff knew that at the end of the trial the
question of whether the defendant was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law remained a live issue. 10 9 The plaintiff, therefore, was
not deprived of the opportunity or motive to present any additional
evidence that a jury issue remained.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In holding that "reading all day long" is not a major life activity
without discussing whether reading itself is a major life activity, the
court avoids ruling on whether reading is cognizable as a major life
activity in the Seventh Circuit. The court's holding makes it harder
for individuals with reading limitations, caused by physical
impairments, to plan their litigation strategy. Even though the
category has not been formally foreclosed, the safer road for
plaintiffs is certainly to allege "seeing" as the major life activity and
establish that their difficulty in reading substantially limits their
ability to see. The latter is, of course, more difficult to prove. The
result is that claims that would be sustained in other circuits that
recognize reading as a major life activity are more likely to fail on
preliminary motions or at trial in the Seventh Circuit.
The confusion on how to interpret Szmaj is not limited to
litigants and their representatives. Some lower courts in the Seventh
Circuit are reticent to analyze reading as a major life activity, lest
they "guess wrong" and face being overturned."10 Other courts are
left confused about what Szmaj actually stands for. For instance, a
recent Seventh Circuit district court in Spears v. Delphi Automotive
109. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
110. See generally Radimecky v. Mercy Health Care and Rehab. Ctr., No.
00-C-2889, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2001)
(stating, "This court expressly reserves judgment as to whether reading
actually constitutes a major life activity and will instead focus on whether
Radimecky's impairment substantially limits any of the major life activities
alleged."); see also id. at * 17 n.2 (noting that just three weeks after the Szmaj
district court decision, that "[a]fter an exhaustive search of federal law, this
court found no cases in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit holding that reading is a major life activity and only one case in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding that reading is a
major life activity.")
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Systems Corp."' closely tracked the Szmaj court's language, citing
Szmaj as having "recently addressed whether the ability to read all
day long is a major life activity."' 112 A different Seventh Circuit
district court in Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish,1 3 however, interpreted
the Szmaj holding differently stating, "[i]n a case recently decided by
the Seventh Circuit, an employee's condition that kept him from
reading for more than 50 percent of the day was found not to limit
the major life activity of seeing."'' 4 The confusion generated by the
Seventh Circuit's clumsy and cursory analysis of "reading all day" as
a major life activity not only gave little direction to future litigants,
but also confused the lower courts, which is likely to result in
inconsistent verdicts among lower courts in the same circuit.
The Seventh Circuit declined to equate discomfort with
disability in evaluating substantial limitation, expressing concern that
otherwise "a very large fraction of the work force would be
disabled.""' 5 The same concerns are probably at the heart of the
court's refusal to extend the list of major life activities to include
reading. However, by keeping the bar high for the substantial
limitation prong, as the court did in Szmaj, the danger that extending
the list would increase the number of possible plaintiffs is reduced.
Maintaining the high standard to establish substantial limitation is
also in line with both the EEOC's regulations and the recent
direction from the Supreme Court, as reiterated in Gonzales.116 By
extending the list to cover reading, the Seventh Circuit would make
relief available to plaintiffs who are truly substantially limited in the
major life activity of reading, although they are not substantially
limited in the major life activity of "seeing." Reading has become an
integral part of success in modem society, even for those who fall
outside the "bookworms" or "judges" categories recognized by the
court. Therefore, it merits recognition as a major life activity.
111. No. IP 00-1653-C-T/K, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15131, at *1 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 15, 2002).
112. Id. at*32.
113. 205 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
114. Id. at929.
115. Szmaj v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2002).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 88-98.
1354
SZMAJ V. AT&T
V. CONCLUSION
The Szmaj court, departing from the issues raised by the lower
court or the litigants, discussed whether "reading all day" was a
major life activity. Its cursory dismissal left litigants and lower
courts confused. Additionally, its failure to discuss whether reading
alone is a major life activity left the Seventh Circuit without
direction on this important issue. The court seemed concerned that
extending the list of major life activities would include too many
plaintiffs. However, by strictly enforcing the "substantial limitation"
requirement, the court can avoid rewarding unmeritorious litigants
while granting relief to those in need.
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